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Abstract— So far, the problem of positioning in wireless net-
works has been mainly studied in a non-adversarial setting. In
this work, we analyze the resistance of positioning techniques to
position and distance spoofing attacks. We propose a mechanism
for secure positioning of wireless devices, that we call Verifiable
Multilateration. We then show how this mechanism can be used
to secure positioning in sensor networks. We analyze our system
through simulations. Keywords: System design, Simulations. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, researchers have proposed a number of positioning
and distance estimation techniques for wireless networks [1],
[2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. However, they all studied these techniques
in non-adversarial settings. Distance estimation and position-
ing techniques are, nevertheless, highly vulnerable to attacks
from compromised nodes and external attackers. Compromised
nodes can report false position and distance information in
order to cheat on their locations. External attackers can modify
(spoof) the measured positions and distances of wireless nodes.
Few proposals for secure distance and location verifica-
tion have already been proposed. Brands and Chaum [7]
propose a distance bounding protocol that can be used to
verify the proximity of two devices connected by a wired
link. Sastry, Shankar and Wagner [8] propose a new distance
bounding protocol, based on ultrasound and radio wireless
communication. Both proposals focused on the verification
of the distance to a device, or on its presence in a region
of interest. Poovendran and Lazos [9] proposed a set of
techniques for secure positioning in sensor networks based
on directional antennas. Kuhn [10] proposed an asymmetric
security mechanism for navigation signals. Both proposals
address secure position computation by a node, but not secure
position verification (typically by an authority).
In this work, we propose a mechanism for secure position
computation and verification of positions of wireless devices.
We call our mechanism Verifiable Multilateration (VM). This
mechanism is based on the measurements of the time of
radio signal propagation (i.e., time-of-flight (ToF)). Verifiable
Multilateration consists of conventional multilateration with
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distance bounding or distance estimation and enables verifica-
tion of node positions by a set of (at least three) base stations,
which do not need to be tightly synchronized.
In Verifiable Multilateration, we primarily make use of
the distance bounding protocols; however, as we will show,
Verifiable Multilateration can also be used with conventional
radio frequency time-of-flight distance estimation techniques.
We will show that by using conventional distance estimation
instead of distance bounding, some security properties of the
Verifiable Multilateration mechanism can still be preserved.
Because of its generality, Verifiable Multilateration can be
used to secure positioning in a variety of systems. In this
work, we focus on sensor network positioning and we propose
SPINE, a system for Secure Positioning In sensor NEtworks.
This system is based on Verifiable Multilateration and ensures
secure positioning of sensors in the presence of adversaries.
We present a security and performance analysis of SPINE.
The organization of the rest of the paper is the following.
In Section II, we provide a survey of positioning techniques
and analyze attacks against them. In Section III, we describe
a technique for radio frequency distance bounding. In Sec-
tions IV, we describe our technique for position verification
called Verifiable Multilateration (VM). In Section V, we
present a scheme for secure positioning of a network of
sensors. In Section VI, we present an overview of current
proposals and techniques for positioning in wireless networks,
based on Verifiable Multilateration. We conclude the paper in
Section VII.
II. ATTACKS AGAINST POSITION AND DISTANCE
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES
We now review positioning and distance estimation tech-
niques and analyze their vulnerabilities.
We first shortly present our attacker model. We call an
attacker external if the attacker cannot authenticate itself as
an honest network node to other network nodes or to a central
authority. We call a node compromised if it is controlled by
an attacker and it can authenticate itself to the authority and
to other network nodes [11]. We assume that when a node is
compromised, its secret keys and other secrets that it shares
with other nodes are known to the attacker.
A. Global Positioning System (GPS)
The Global Positioning System is today the most wide-
spread outdoor positioning system for mobile devices. The
Dishonest node Attacker
RSS (Received Signal Strength) Distance enlargement and reduction Distance enlargement and reduction
US time-of-flight (ToF) Distance enlargement and reduction Distance enlargement and reduction
RF time-of-flight (ToF) Distance enlargement and reduction Distance enlargement only
US distance bounding Distance enlargement only Distance enlargement and reduction
RF distance bounding Distance enlargement only Distance enlargement only
Civilian GPS False position reports Position spoofing
TABLE I
VULNERABILITIES OF THE POSITIONING AND DISTANCE ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES TO DISTANCE AND POSITION SPOOFING ATTACKS.
system is based on a set of satellites that provide a three
dimensional positioning with accuracy of around 3 m. GPS
also provides devices with an accurate time reference. GPS,
however, has several limitations: it cannot be used for indoor
positioning nor for positioning in dense urban regions: in
those cases, because of the interferences and obstacles, satellite
signals cannot reach the GPS devices. Furthermore, the civilian
GPS was never designed for secure positioning. Civilian GPS
devices can be “spoofed” by GPS satellite simulators, which
produce fake satellite radio signals that are stronger than
the real signals coming from satellites. Most current GPS
receivers are totally fooled, accepting these stronger signals
while ignoring the weaker, authentic signals. GPS satellite
simulators are legitimately used to test new GPS products and
can be bought for $10k-$50k or rented for just $1k per month.
Some simple software changes to most GPS receivers would
permit them to detect relatively unsophisticated spoofing at-
tacks [12]. Nevertheless, more sophisticated spoofing attacks
would still be hard to detect. Military GPS are protected from
position spoofing by codes which cannot be reproduced by
the attackers. Recently, Kuhn [10] proposed an asymmetric
security mechanism for navigation signals that can be used to
secure civilian GPS. This mechanism is, however, vulnerable
to some sophisticated attacks involving jamming and fast
wormholes.
Even if a mobile node is able to obtain its correct position
from the GPS satellites, the authority or another mobile node
have no way to verify the correctness of node’s position,
unless the mobile node is equipped with a trusted software
or hardware module [13].
B. Ultrasound (US)
Ultrasound-based systems operate by measuring ToF of the
sound signal measured between two nodes. An interesting
feature of these systems is that, if used with RF signals, they
do not require any time synchronization between the sender
and the receiver. The limitations of the US-based systems are
that, due to outdoor interferences, US systems can be mainly
used indoors, and that the US signals can be animal-unfriendly.
US-based systems are vulnerable to distance reduction and
distance enlargement attacks by external attackers and com-
promised nodes. To reduce the measured distance between
two honest nodes, two external nodes can use a fast radio
link to transmit the signals faster between the honest nodes.
Furthermore, by jamming and replaying the signals at a later
time, external attacker can enlarge the measured distances
between honest nodes. If conventional US ToF technique is
used, a compromised node can also reduce or enlarge the
measured distance by laying about the signal sending/reception
times or by simply delaying its response to honest nodes.
Recently, Sastry, Shankar and Wagner [8] have proposed
a US-based distance bounding technique which resists to
distance reduction attacks from compromised nodes; it does
not, however, resist to attacks from external attackers. This
does not mean that this technique is useless for secure appli-
cations; it can still be used for verifying location claims in
systems in which attackers have no physical access to the
localization region. In [14] Waters and Felten presented a
similar technique.
C. Radio (RF)
In techniques based on the Received Signal Strength (RSS),
the distance is computed based on the transmitted and received
signal strengths. To cheat on the measured distance, a com-
promised node therefore only needs to report a false power
level to an honest node. External attackers can also modify the
measured distance between two honest nodes by jamming the
nodes’ mutual communication and by replaying the messages
with higher or lower power strengths.
RF time-of-flight-based systems exhibit the best security
properties. In these systems, nodes measure their mutual dis-
tance based on the time of propagation of the signal between
them. Because RF signals travel at the speed of light, an
external attackers can, by jamming and replaying the signals,
only increase, but not decrease the measured time-of-flight
between the nodes. A compromised node can further cheat
on the distance by laying about the signal transmission and
reception times.
An RF distance bounding technique proposed by Brands and
Chaum [7] exhibits better security properties than conventional
RF ToF distance estimation; it allows the nodes to upper bound
their distances to other nodes, meaning that it prevents a com-
promised node from reducing the measured distance. As we
will show in Section III in more detail, with RF ToF distance-
bounding protocols, external attackers and compromised nodes
can only increase, but not decrease the measured distances to
honest nodes.
D. Conclusion
We conclude our review with the summary of vulnerabilities
of positioning and distance measurement systems shown on
Table I, which illustrates that the RF ToF-based positioning
solutions are best suited for secure positioning. The reason is
that with RF it is generally possible to perform non-line-of-
sight distance estimations; the precision of the system can be
very high (15 cm error with Ultra Wide Band systems at a
distance of 2 km [15]). Furthermore, the RF ToF distance
estimation and distance bounding techniques are the most
effective techniques to counter attacks from external attackers
and compromised nodes. A potential drawback of these sys-
tems is that, because they rely on the speed of light, the devices
need to have a fast-processing hardware. In the following
section we present in more detail the protocols for RF ToF
distance estimation and distance bounding, and we discuss
how they can be implemented with current technologies.
III. DISTANCE BOUNDING
Distance bounding techniques are used to upper bound the
distance of one device to another (compromised) device. As
we indicated in Table I, RF-based distance bounding protocols
are vulnerable to distance enlargement attacks but not to
distance reduction attacks. Distance bounding protocols are
used by a verifier v to verify that a claimant node u being at
a distance duv from a verifier node v, cannot claim to be at a
distance d′uv < duv . These protocols were first introduced by
Brands and Chaum [7] to prevent Mafia Fraud attacks.
The pseudocode of the distance bounding protocol is shown
in figure 1. In the first step of the protocol, the claimant u
commits to a random value Nu. The verifier replies with a
challenge nonce Nv , sends it to u in a reverse bit order and
starts its timer as soon as the last bit of the challenge has been
sent. The claimant u responds immediately with Nv
⊕
Nu,
upon receiving the challenge from v. Once the verifier has
received the response from u it stops the timer and converts
the challenge-response time tvu to a distance dvu. In the last
step of the protocol, u authenticates itself to v and reveals the
decommit value dˆ. The authentication and the authenticity of
d is ensured with a message authentication code (MAC), using
a secret key Kvu that u and v share. Finally, v verifies if the
value Nu received in the time-measuring phase corresponds
to the received (commit, decommit) pair (c, dˆ).
The commitment scheme needs to satisfy two properties:
(i) a user who commits to a certain value cannot change this
value afterwards (we say that the scheme is binding), (ii)
the commitment is hidden from its receiver until the sender
“opens” it (we say that the scheme is hiding). A commitment
scheme transforms a value m into a commitment/opening pair
(c, d), where c reveals no information about m, but (c, d)
together reveal m, and it is infeasible to find dˆ such that (c, dˆ)
reveals mˆ = m. Simple commitment schemes can be realized
with hash functions, which do not impose high computational
requirements on sensor nodes.
The described protocol is suitable for devices that can
perform rapid message exchanges, execute XOR operations
rapidly, and perform encryption. In the case of RF-based
distance bounding, the most important assumptions are that
the claimant needs to be able to bound its processing (XOR)
u : Generate random nonce Nu
: Generate commitment (c, d) = commit(Nu)
u→ v : c
v : Generate random nonce Nv
v → u : Nv (bits sent from MSB to LSB)
u→ v : Nu
⊕
Nv (bits sent from LSB to MSB)




u→ v : Nu, Nv, d,MACKuv (u,Nu, Nv, d)
v: Verify MAC and verify if
Nu = open(c, d)
Fig. 1. Pseudocode of the distance bounding protocol.
to a few nanoseconds, and that the verifier v needs to be able
to measure time with nanosecond precision (1ns corresponds
to the time that it takes an electromagnetic wave to propagate
over 30 cm). This requirement allows the node to perform
distance bounding with radio signals with an uncertainty of
30 cm. We are aware that a nanosecond processing and time
measurements are achievable only with dedicated hardware.
Recent developments in location system show that RF time of
flight systems based on Ultra Wide Band (UWB) can achieve
nanosecond precision of measured times of signal flight (and
consequently of the distances). The tests with Multispectral
solution’s UWB Precision Asset Location system [16] consist-
ing of active tags and tracking devices show that this system
can provide two- and three-dimensional location of objects to
within a few centimeters. The range of the system is 100 m
indoor and 2km outdoor. The used UWB tags are active and
roughly the size of a wristwatch, weighing approximately 40
grams each.
In the case of a US-based distance bounding, node process-
ing speed and clock accuracy can be of the order of mil-
liseconds. Thus, US distance bounding can be easily imple-
mented with off-the-shelf components such as microphones
and 802.11 wireless cards [8].
IV. VERIFIABLE MULTILATERATION
In Section II, we described security problems related to
various positioning and distance estimation techniques and in
Section III we showed how the devices can upper-bound their
mutual distances. We now propose a technique for position
verification that we call Verifiable Multilateration (VM). This
technique enables a secure computation and verification of
the positions of mobile devices in the presence of attackers.
By secure position computation we mean that base stations
compute a correct position of a node in the presence of
attacker; by secure position verification we mean that the base
stations verify a position reported by the node.
Multilateration is a technique for determining the position
of a (mobile) device from a set of reference points whose
positions are known, based on the distances measured between
the reference points and the device. The position of the device
in two (three) dimensions can be computed if the device
measured its distance to three (four) reference points. As we
already detailed in Section II, distance estimation techniques
are vulnerable to attacks from external attackers and from
compromised nodes, which can maliciously modify the mea-
sured distances. Multilateration is equally vulnerable to the
same set of attacks because it relies on distance estimations.
A. Algorithm
Verifiable Multilateration relies on distance bounding. It
consists of distance bound measurements from at least three
reference points (verifiers) to the considered device (the
claimant) and of subsequent computations performed by an
authority. For simplicity, we show the algorithm for two
dimensional positioning; at the end of this subsection, we
briefly explain how a similar algorithm can be applied to the
three dimensional case.
The intuition behind verifiable multilateration algorithm is
the following. Because of the distance bounding property, the
claimant can only pretend that it is more distant from the
verifier than it really is. If it increases the measured distance
to one of the verifiers, to keep the position consistent, the
claimant needs to prove that at least one of the measured
distances to other verifiers is shorter than it actually is, which
it cannot because of the distance bounding. This property
holds only if the position of the claimant is determined within
the triangle formed by the verifiers. This can be explained
with a simple example: if an object is located within the
triangle, and it moves to a different position within the triangle,
it will certainly reduce its distance to at least one of the
triangle vertices. The same properties hold if an external
attacker enlarges distances between verifiers and an honest
claimant. This basic intuition behind verifiable multilateration
is illustrated in Figure 2a.
The verifiable multilateration algorithm is executed by the
verifiers and by the authority as follows.
Verifiable multilateration
T = Ø; set of verification triangles around u
V = {v1, ..., vn}; set of verifiers in the power range of u
1 For all vi ∈ V , perform distance bounding
from vi to u and obtain dbi
2 With all vi ∈ V , compute the estimate (x′u, y′u) of the position
by MMSE
3 If for all vi ∈ V , |dbi −
 
(xi − x′u)2 + (yi − y′u)2| ≤ δ then
for all (vi, vj , vk) ∈ V3, if (x′u, y′u) ∈ (vi, vj , vk)
then T = T ∪ (vi, vj , vk)
if |T | > 0 then position is accepted and xu = x′u, yu = y′u
else the position is rejected
else the position is rejected
In step 1 of the algorithm, the verifiers v1, ..., vn which are in
the power range of the claimant u perform distance bounding
to the claimant u and obtain distance bounds db1, ..., dbn.
These distance bounds as well as the positions of the verifiers
(which are precisely known) are then reported to the authority.
In step 2, the authority computes an estimate (x′, y′) of the















Fig. 2. Examples of Verifiable Multilateration. a) with three verifiers. b) with
six verifiers.
bounds from all verifiers in u’s neighborhood, typically by the
MMSE of the following system of equations:
Let fi(x′u, y′u) = dbi −
 
(xi − x′u)2 + (yi − y′u)2












over all estimates of u
In step 3 of the algorithm, the authority runs the following
two tests: (i) δ-test: for all vi, does the distance between
(x′u, y
′
u) and vi differ from the measured distance bound dbi
by less than the expected distance measurement error δ and
(ii) point in the triangle test: does (x′u, y′u) fall within at least
one physical triangle formed by a triplet of verifiers. Note also
that we call the triangle formed by the verifiers the verification
triangle. If both the δ and the point in the triangle tests are
positive, the authority accepts the estimated position (x′u, y′u)
of the claimant as correct; else, the position is rejected.
The expected error δ is a system parameter and depends
on the number of verifiers and on the distance estimation
techniques used. This error becomes smaller as more verifiers
are used to compute (x′u, y′u). In most cases, δ can be approxi-
mated as 3σ, where σ is the expected standard deviation of the
computed position. The following well known test is run to
detect if the claimants estimated position (x′u, y′u) falls within
the verification triangle (vi, vj , vk):
Point in the triangle test
fij(u) = (y
′
u − yi)(xj − xi)− (x′u − xi)(yj − yi)
fki(u) = (y
′
u − yk)(xi − xk)− (x′u − xk)(yi − yk)
fjk(u) = (y
′
u − yj)(xk − xj)− (x′u − xj)(yk − yj)
If fij(u) · fjk(u) > 0 and fjk(u) · fki(u) > 0
then u is in (vi, vj , vk)
The logic behind this test is the following. Three functions
fij(u), fik(u), fjk(u) are defined, one for each edge of the
triangle. fij(u) is zero for all points u on the line vi, vj ,
and non-zero for all other points. In fact, looking from vj
at vi, fij(u) is negative for all points (x, y) on the left side
of the edge vi, vj , and positive for all points (x,y) on the
right side of the edge. The same applies for the other two
edges and functions. By combining the output from the three
functions we can compute if a point falls in or out of the
triangle (vi, vj , vk).
If both the δ and the point in the triangle tests are positive,
this means that the claimant falls in at least one verification
triangle vi, vj , vk, and that distance bounds (dbi, dbj , dbk) are
consistent with the estimated position and with each other
(Figure 2a). This means that none of the distance bounds
(dbi, dbj , dbk) were enlarged.
If any of the distance-bounds dbi differs from the estimated
position (x′u, y′u) by more than δ, this indicates that there is
a possible distance enlargement attack on one or more of the
distance bounds that caused such an unexpectedly high error
to occur. If a larger number of verification triangles can be
formed around u, the authority can try to detect which of the
distances are enlarged. Those distances can then be filtered-out
and the position can be computed with the remaining set of
distances. This detection is performed such that the position
of u is computed independently in each triangle. If in a given
triangle the computation is successful, then all the distance
bounds from the verifiers forming that triangle are considered
correct; otherwise, all three distance bounds are considered
suspicious.
Detection of enlarged distances:
C = Ø; set of verifiers with correctly measured bounds
NC = Ø; set of verifiers whose bounds are suspicious
1 For all vi ∈ T
if in at least one of the verification triangles
with vi the position of u is computed correctly
then dbi is correct, C = C ∪ {vi}
else NC = NC ∪ {vi}
2 For all vi ∈ NC
if vi can create a verification triangle
with any pair (vj , vk) ∈ C2
then dbi is subject to an enlargement attack
3 With all vi ∈ C, compute the estimate (x′′u, y′′u) of the position
by MMSE
4 For all vi ∈ NC, if |dbi −
 
(xi − x′u)2 + (yi − y′u)2| ≤ δ
then dbi is subject to an enlargement attack
In this algorithm, the number of verification triangles and the
number of enlarged distances will determine if the algorithm
can detect which distance(s) is(are) enlarged. Nevertheless,
in all cases, even if the number of verifiers is strictly equal
to three, the Verifiable Multilateration algorithm will detect
any distance enlargement attack (even if only one distance
is enlarged), but it will not always be able to detect which
distance it is.
Verifiable Multilateration can be also applied to three di-
mensional positioning. For this, the system requires a mini-
mum of four verifiers, that form a triangular pyramid, within
which the secure determination of the claimant’s position is
possible. The algorithm is then executed in way similar to the
two-dimensional case.
B. Properties
In this subsection, we summarize the most important prop-
erties of the Verifiable Multilateration mechanism. These are
the following:
1) A node located at position p within the triangle/pyramid
formed by the verifiers cannot prove to be at another
position p′ = p within the same triangle/pyramid.
2) A node located outside the triangle/pyramid formed by
the verifiers cannot prove to be at any position p within
the triangle/pyramid.
3) An external attacker performing a distance enlargement
attack cannot trick the verifiers into believing that a
claimant located at a location p in the triangle/pyramid
is located at some other position p′ = p in the trian-
gle/pyramid.
4) An external attacker performing a distance enlargement
attack cannot trick the verifiers into believing that a
claimant is located at any position p within the trian-
gle/pyramid, if the claimant is located outside of the
triangle/pyramid.
To prove properties 1 and 3 we propose the following theorem,
that applies to (two dimensional) trilateration. Note that a
similar theorem can be constructed for properties 2 and 4.
Theorem 1: For any two points p and p′ (p = p′), located
within a triangle (vi,vj ,vk), at least one, but not more than
two of the following inequalities hold:
dbip > dbip′ ; dbjp > dbjp′ ; dbkp > dbkp′ ;
where dbip represents the distance between the verifier vi and
node p.
Proof:
We observe the three circles Ci, Cj and Ck with centers at
vi, vj and vk and radiuses dbip, dbjp and dbkp respectively.
We assume that the three circles intersect in a point p and that
this point is in the triangle (vi, vj , vk).
We now consider another point p′ = p in (vi, vj , vk). We
observe that p′ can be in one of the two disjoint regions: (i)
in the circle Ci, (i.e., dbip > dbip′ ) (ii) outside of Ci, or on
its border (i.e., dbip ≤ dbip′ ).
If dip > dip′ , the theorem holds directly. If dip ≤ dip′ , it
necessarily follows that one or both of the following equations
hold djp > djp′ ; dkp > dkp′ . To show this, it is sufficient to
notice that if Ci, Cj and Ck intersect at a single point within
the triangle, the triangle is located in the region Ci∪Cj ∪Ck.
From this, it follows that if dip < dip′ , then p′ is not in Ci,
or on the border of Ci but in Cj ∪ Ck. p′ cannot be situated
at the borders of Cj and Ck because the only intersection of
Cj and Ck in the triangle is in p. From this it follows that
p′ needs to be in Cj or in Ck or in both circles. From this
it directly follows that at least one of the following equations
holds: djp > djp′ ; dkp > dkp′ . 
An equivalent theorem can be proposed for the three
dimensional multilateration. The proof would then consist
in showing that if a claimant located within the triangular
pyramid moves at a different position within the pyramid, it
will certainly reduce its distance to one of the verifiers.
C. Verifiable Multilateration with distance estimation
Verifiable Multilateration can also be performed with au-
thenticated distance estimation, instead of distance bounding.
Authenticated distance estimation enables nodes to securely
associate estimated distances to true node identities. A possible
implementation of authenticated distance estimation is to base
it on classical three-pass authentication protocols. If the nodes
are tightly synchronized, they can measure the signal time of
flight to estimate their mutual distance. In the packets they
send, nodes include timestamps of the times at which they
sent the packets. Upon receiving a packet, each node registers
the packet reception time, and estimates the distance based on
the difference between the sending and the reception time.
If the nodes’ clocks are not tightly synchronized, but the
nodes can measure time precisely, they can measure message
roundtrip times and processing times, and estimate their dis-
tance accordingly. The implementation of the authenticated
distance estimation can be based on symmetric-key or public-
key cryptography, depending whether the nodes share secret
keys, or hold each others’ authentic public keys.
If implemented with authenticated distance estimation, VM
offers protection only from external attackers, but not from
compromised nodes. This is why it could be used only in
cooperative scenarios in which the claimant and the verifiers
cooperate to securely determine the position of the claimant. In
the following sections, we will mainly make use of VM with
distance bounding; at appropriate places, we will comment on
the possible use of VM with distance estimation.
D. The threat of device cloning
With verifiable multilateration, an authority can prevent a
single compromised node from cheating about its position.
However, if an attacker owns several devices and each device
looks to the authority as the same node, the attacker can still
successfully cheat on its position. One attack assumes that the
attacker places three/four devices within the triangle/triangular
pyramid, such that each device is close to one of the verifiers.
Each of the devices can then show to its corresponding base
station (by delaying the messages) that it is positioned at any
distance larger than their actual distance (which is small). As to
the base stations these devices appear to be a single claimant,
the attacker can prove to be at any distance to the base stations,
and thus at any position in the verification triangle/triangular
pyramid.
A solution that prevents this attack is to make claimanr
devices tamper-proof such that their authentication material is
not revealed to the attacker and that they cannot be cloned;
however, as shown in [13] tamper-proofness has its limitations.
Another possibility is that the base stations perform device
fingerprinting [17] by which they identify each device as
unique. In that case, the base stations can identify a claimant
device by the unique “fingerprint” that characterizes its signal
transmission. This process is used by cellular network oper-
ators to prevent cloning fraud; namely, a cloned phone does
not have the same fingerprint as the legal phone with the same
electronic identification numbers.
E. Secure node tracking
One of the most direct applications of Verifiable Trilater-
ation mechanism is the secure tracking of mobile devices.
This can be enabled by creating a tracking infrastructure that
consists of a set of verifiers, which can be fixed, with prede-
termined positions, or randomly distributed over the area of
interest, or even mobile. For the simplicity of presentation, we
will analyze this infrastructure in a two-dimensional case; the
generalization to the three-dimensional case is straightforward.
The number of verifiers needed to cover an area, such that
position verification can be performed in the whole area, de-
pends on the number of verifiers and their (and mobile nodes’)
power ranges. So far, we have assumed that the power range
of each verifier can cover the verification triangle and that the
position verification is thus enabled in the whole triangle. This
is, however, not true in general; the verification triangle is the
largest possible region in which three verifiers can verify node
positions. If the power ranges of the verifiers are such that they
do not cover the whole triangle, the verification region can be
significantly smaller than the verification triangle. Only if the
verifiers are in each others’ power ranges will the verification
region be equal to the verification triangle.
For this reason, the optimal way to cover an area of interest
is to place the verifiers within the area such that they form
regular triangles with sides equal to their power ranges. In
this case, the number n of verifiers needed to cover a square
area of L× L is
n = [2L/R + 3][2L/R + 1]/2
where L is the area width and length, R is the power range
of the verifiers and mobile nodes. In this way, each verifier
(except for the boundary verifiers) will be a verifier in six
triangles (i.e., in a hexagon).
We now consider the case in which, instead of being pre-
deployed on fixed locations, the verifiers are uniformly dis-
tributed over the area of interest. We performed simulations to
determine the number of verifiers necessary to cover the area.
This coverage will depend on the sizes and the positions of the
verification triangles formed by the verifiers. Our simulations
were performed on areas of variable sizes (from 500× 500 to
2000 × 2000 m2 with verifiers power ranges of 250 m). To
avoid boundary effects, the verifiers were uniformly distributed
in the area and in a boundary region outside the area, whose
width was 10% of the area width.
The results of an average of 100 simulations are shown in
Figure 3 and are displayed with confidence intervals of 95%.
As expected, an optimal placement of verifiers is much more
efficient than their random placement, in terms of number of
nodes.
However, for security purposes, in some scenarios, it might




Fig. 3. Number of verifiers required to cover an area (L×L) with verification
triangles. The power range is 250 m.
randomly move within the area of interest and thus not to
have their positions known at all times. Verifier mobility
could also prevent the cloning attack and would facilitate
the reconstruction of the device trajectory. Furthermore, to
reconstruct the trajectory of a node, the verifiers do not need
to know the positions of the node at all times; the positions
that are not verified can often be reconstructed from the known
ones.
As we already noted, if the verifiers are placed only
within the area of interest, because of the boundary effects,
verification triangles cannot cover the whole intended area.
Therefore, verifiers need to be distributed also around the
boundaries outside of the area of interest. In the case of a
carefully planned tracking infrastructure, the verifiers can be
placed either outside of the area or exactly on its borders.
V. SPINE: SECURE POSITIONING IN SENSOR NETWORKS
One of the main challenges in sensor networks [18], [19],
[20], [21] is sensor positioning. Knowing the positions of
sensors is important for relating the measured data with the
physical location. Researchers have recently proposed a num-
ber of positioning algorithms for sensor and ad hoc networks
(see Section VI). The majority of the proposed algorithms rely
on insecure local distance measurements and on cooperation
between the nodes that are not necessarily trustworthy.
In this section, we present SPINE, a system for secure
positioning of a network of sensors, that is based on Verifiable
Multilateration. We first shortly describe attacks on sensor
network positioning systems.
A. Threat analysis
We characterize attackers according to the number of exter-
nal and compromised nodes that they control. By Attacker-x-y
we denote attacker that controls x compromised and y external
nodes.
1) Node physical displacement and removal: One of the
most obvious threats to sensor networks is the physical dis-
placement of nodes. An attacker can physically displace nodes
from their original positions to other positions in the network,
or can temporarily or permanently remove the nodes from
the network while this remains undetected to the nodes or
to the network authority. These attacks are especially harmful
in sensor networks, in which the nodes are, given their size
and purpose, in most cases easily accessible to the attacker.
It would be naive to believe that this problem can be solved
only by a simple exchange of authenticated beacons between
the nodes, or by conventional positioning techniques. If the
network is not properly protected, an external attacker can
create the impression to the displaced node and to its neighbors
that the node did not move. A simple approach for the attacker
is to replace the network node with a fake one, and to
create a communication link to the new position of the honest
node. Typically, this attack can be performed by Attacker-0-2.
By enabling communication between two honest nodes, the
attacker easily creates the impression to the nodes that their
positions remained unchanged. This attack, that we call the
node displacement attack is illustrated in Figure 4, case a).
2) Attacks on node positioning: Even without displacing
the nodes, an external attacker can still perform a number of
attacks on node positions and network topology. An example
of this behavior is the wormhole attack shown in Figure 4, case
b), by which the attacker establishes links between nodes that
are not in each others’ power range. This attack can be typi-
cally performed by Attacker-0-2. Besides the establishment of
new links, attackers can permanently or temporarily jam the
communication between pairs of nodes and thus by remove
links that would normally exist. This attack can be even
performed by Attacker-0-1. These two attacks could easily
jeopardize the security of sensor positioning systems that rely
exclusively on beacons.
Attacks by compromised nodes are simpler to perform
and can be more harmful than those performed by external
nodes. Compromised nodes can modify the computed network
topology by reporting non-existing links, or by not establishing
or not reporting the links that would normally be established.
A set of compromised nodes controlled by the same attacker
can, by disseminating false information from the nodes that
it controls, influence the view of other network nodes or of
the central authority about the network topology and node
positions. As we already detailed in Section II, an Attacker-1-
0 can report false signal strength or time-of-flight values and
can thus easily spoof the distance that other nodes measure
to it. The false position and distance dissemination attack is
illustrated in Figure 4, case d).
B. System model
Our system consists of a set of sensor nodes and a set
of reference nodes (landmarks) with known locations. Nodes
and verifiers communicate using radio transmissions. If two
nodes reside within the power range of each other, they are
considered neighbors. We assume that the radio link between
neighbors is bidirectional. Nodes measure local information,
which is then collected by the central authority. Communica-



































Fig. 4. Attacks on sensor network positioning.
not make any specific assumptions about the routing protocol
used to transfer packets from their source to their destination.
We assume that the sensor nodes have distance-measuring
capabilities, but are not equipped with GPS receivers. We
assume, notably, that the nodes are able to measure the
distances to their neighbors or to the landmarks by using
time-of-arrival or round-trip time measurements with radio
signals. We also assume that the nodes are able to bound their
processing delays to a few nanoseconds.
We assume that the network is operated by an authority. This
authority can be on-line, meaning that the authority operates
on-line servers (by single hop or multi-hop communication),
or off-line, meaning that the services of the authority cannot
be reached via the network. In any case, the authority controls
the network membership and assigns a unique identity to each
node. We further assume that each node is able generally to
accomplish any task required to secure its communications.
We do not assume, however, that the nodes are able to generate
or verify public-key signatures. We assume that all network
nodes can establish pairwise secret keys. This can be achieved
by manually pre-loading all keys into the nodes in a network
setup phase, by probabilistic key pre-distribution schemes [22],
[23], or through an on-line key distribution center [11].
C. SPINE algorithm
Our secure positioning algorithm (SPINE) is based on
Verifiable Multilateration. The algorithm is executed in three
phases: (i) the sensors measure distance bounds to their neigh-
bors, (ii) the distance bounds are verified through verifiable
multilateration and (iii) the positions of the nodes are com-
puted with a distributed or centralized range-based positioning
algorithm. We note here that sensor distance bounding can be
performed simultaneously between two sensors; a protocol that
enables this was proposed by ˇCapkun, Buttyan and Hubaux
in [24].
The algorithm is executed as follows.
SPINE algorithm:
VD = {Ø}; set of verifiable distance bounds
NV = {Ø}; set of non-verifiable distance bounds
DB = {all distance bounds}
For all distances dbi ∈ DB
if dbi can be verified with BDV then VD = VD ∪ {dbi}
else NV = NV ∪ {dbi}
Compute the positions of the nodes with dbi ∈ VD
Compare the computed positions with dbi ∈ NV
BDV stands for Basic Distance Verification (BDV). BDV is
illustrated in Figure 5; it relies on Verifiable Multilateration.
BDV of the distance between v and u is performed by (i) form-
ing verification triangles around u with v and its neighbors,
(ii) by forming verification triangles around v with u and its
neighbors and (iii) by forming verifiable triangles around u and
v. In our example, the following triangles are formed around
v: (u, v1, v2), (u, v3, v4), (u, v1, v4), and (u, v2, v3);
only a single triangle (v, v5, v6) is formed around u. Finally,
a triangle (v4, v5, v6) is formed around both u and v. After
forming the triangles, the measured distance bounds dbuv
(from u to v) and dbvu (from v to u) are verified in all
triangles, by performing verifiable multilateration over u and
v, respectively. This is done in such a way that the nodes
forming a triangle define a local coordinate system, in which
they then compute the position of u or v, or the positions of
both u and v. The computation of the position of u and v







Fig. 5. Basic distance verification (BDV). To verify a distance, a set of
triangles is formed around the measured distance bound.
distance bounds dbuv and dbvu are then verified. Verification
of the distance bound is successful within BDV only if in all
verification triangles the measured distance bounds dbuv and
dbvu match the computed positions (with a tolerance of δ).
The algorithm is executed as follows.
Basic Distance Verification:
Measure dbuv by u and measure dbvu by v
1 Triangles are formed with v and its neighbors;
US is the set of triangles in which u lays
2 Triangles are formed with u and its neighbors;
VS is the set of triangles in which v lays
3 Triangles are formed with neighbors of u and v;
UVS is the set of triangles in which u and v lay
4 In all  ∈ US ∪ VS ∪ UVS compute duv with VM
5 If for all  ∈ US ∪ VS ∪ UVS , |duv − dbuv| ≤ δ
and |dvu − dbuv| ≤ δ, then {dbuv, dbvu} are verified
else dbuv, dbvu cannot be verified
The set VD contains those distance bounds that can be
verified by at least one triangle. The distance bounds that
cannot be verified are included into a set VD of non-verified
distances. Once the selection process is finished, the positions
of the nodes can be computed by using only verified distances
from the set VD. Finally, the computed positions of the nodes
are compared with the non-verified distances from NV .
The computation of the positions of the nodes can be
performed by a number of centralized or distributed range-
based positioning algorithms (see Section VI). Note here that
the BDV algorithm can be executed locally as the nodes
forming a triangle are in each other’s power ranges.
The effectiveness of any of the used positioning techniques
(and consequently of SPINE) depends on the number of node
neighbors (node density) and on the number and the spatial
distribution of landmarks. The number of node neighbors is
crucial to ensure that the positions of most of the nodes can be
computed. The requirements for secure positioning are higher:
it is necessary that the network is sufficiently dense to ensure
that the positions of most nodes can be securely computed.
To show the difference between the density requirements
for secure and non-secure positioning, we observe an average
number of distance bounds to the neighbors that can be verified
with BDV (the distances that are used for secure positioning),
and an average number of node neighbors (the distances used
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Fig. 6. An average number of neighbors per node and an average number
of verifiable distances adjacent to a node.











































not including boundary nodes
Fig. 7. The average percentage of nodes covered by at least one verification
triangle, with and without boundary nodes.
for non-secure positioning). We performed simulations on
an area of 100 × 100m, with 50 to 500 uniform randomly
distributed nodes with power ranges of 25 m. The results are
presented in Figure 6 with 95% confidence intervals.
As expected, the results show that to perform secure posi-
tioning equivalently to non-secure positioning (meaning with
approximately the same number of distances), a higher density
of nodes is required. For non-secure positioning, the average
of 10 distances per node (10 neighbors) is reached already
with 80 nodes/100× 100 m2, whereas for secure positioning,
the average of 10 verifiable distances requires at least 110
nodes/100× 100 m2.
We further computed the average percentage of nodes
covered by at least one verification triangle. These results
are shown in Figure 7. This figure is important as it shows
that at node density of 120 nodes/100 × 100 m2, most of
the nodes are covered by at least one verification triangle,
meaning that their adjacent distances and their position can be
verified. As expected, the figure shows that the boundary nodes
are not covered by verification triangles. This is an important
indication that the landmark stations need to be specifically
placed at the boundaries of the area to protect boundary nodes
from attacks by enabling the formation of verification triangles
around them.
D. Security analysis
The resistance of SPINE relies on the resistance of BDV to
attacks; it depends on the ability of the attacker to modify the
verified distances, but also depends on the positioning algo-
rithm used to compute node positions with verified distances.
Here, we primarily analyze the resistance of BDV to attacks.
We then discuss security implications of using BDV with
several positioning algorithms.
The resistance of BDV to attacks depends on the number
and on the mutual dependance of triangles that are formed
around the distance. To spoof a distance verified by a single
triangle, it is sufficient that an external attacker enlarges
two distances (the distance duv , and one additional distance
between the nodes forming a triangle). This is illustrated
on Figure 8, where distances duv and d1 are enlarged. By
enlarging these two distances, all the distances in the verifi-
cation triangle remain mutually consistent. This attack can be
performed by an external attacker.
If only a single node in a triangle is compromised, this
node can enlarge distances to the claimant and to other
nodes forming the verification triangle. This is illustrated on
Figure 9. In this example, node v is compromised, and enlarges
distances to u, v2 and to v3 such that all the distances in the
verification triangle remain mutually consistent. Similarly to
the attack on Figure 8, if an attacker controls one compromised
and one external node, it can enlarge the measured distance
even if the compromised node is not adjacent to the distance.
This essentially means that a single-triangle BDV resists only
to attacks that enlarge only a single distance.
If k verification triangles can be formed around a distance,
the resistance of BDV to attacks can be expressed in terms of
k. If the triangles are node-disjoint, then BDV resists to up to
2k distance enlargements. This is intuitive, as the distance is
verified by k disjoint triangles, and an attacker needs to spoof
the verification process in each of the triangles to successful
cheat on the measured distance.
If the triangles are node-joint and edge-disjoint, then BDV
also resists to up to 2k distance enlargements by external
attackers, but it does not resist attacks by a single compromised
node adjacent to the spoofed distance. Essentially, if all
triangles have a common (compromised) node, the distance
adjacent to that node can be successfully spoofed. We note
here, however, that the triangles formed around a distance are
almost never node-joint, given that some are formed with u
and its neighbors around v, others are formed with v and its
neighbors around u, whereas the third set of triangles is formed
by the neighbors of u and v around the two nodes.
If the triangles are edge-joint, then BDV resists to up to k+1
distance enlargements by external attackers. If the nodes are
positioned favorably for the attacker, the attacker can enlarge
the joint edge and enlarge one additional edge from every













Fig. 8. An example of a distance enlargement attack by external nodes
















Fig. 9. An example of a distance enlargement attack by a compromised
node (v) on a single-triangle BDV. Distance duv a) before enlargement and
b) after enlargement.
We performed simulations on a network of sensors with den-
sities from 50 to 500 nodes/100× 100 m2 and a power range
of 25 m. We computed the average number of verification
triangles and an average number of edge-disjoint verification
triangles that can be formed around a distance. The results
show that BDV, depending on the node density and node
positions, can resist to attacks up to 100 distance enlargements.
To compromise the computation of the position of a single
node, an attacker needs to modify the computation and the
verification of the (verified) distances surrounding the node.
Furthermore, the attacker needs to make all the modified
distances and positions consistent with the positions of other
nodes in the network. The difficulty for the attacker here is in
distance enlargement. Essentially, when the attacker enlarges
distances, it makes some nodes to appear further from each
other, but also makes some unavoidably to appear closer. This
is why in a very dense network, the attacker could only scale-
up all the distances in the network, but it would not be able
to, by changing a smaller number of distances, successfully
modify the computed positions of the nodes.
E. Discussion
SPINE is designed for both centralized and for distributed
secure positioning. As a core part of SPINE, BDV relies solely
on local communication between the nodes. All the triangles
are formed within the local neighborhoods of the nodes. It is
important to observe that the nodes that form a verification
triangle are in each others’ power ranges.
edge-disjoint triangles
Fig. 10. An average number of verification triangles and an average number
of edge-disjoint verification triangles that can be formed around a distance.
Besides SPINE, other approaches based on Verifiable Multi-
lateration can be devised for secure position. If positioning is
performed in a centralized manner, one appealing approach
consists in a posteriori verification of node positions. This
means that the central authority first collects distance bounds
from the nodes, and computes the positions of the nodes
(insecurely). The position of each node is then verified by
Verifiable Multilateration assuming that the positions of its
neighboring nodes are computed correctly. Unlike SPINE, this
approach enables only verification, but not secure computation
of node positions, and might be hard to implement securely
in a decentralized manner.
VI. RELATED WORK ON POSITIONING TECHNIQUES
One of the first indoor localization systems called Active
Badge [1] was infrared(IR)-based. In this system, the location
of each badge (e.g., attached to a person) is determined by
its proximity to the nearest of the fixed receivers installed
throughout the building. Indoor positioning systems based
on the measurements of the propagation of sound were also
proposed. Two examples of such systems are Active Bat [2]
and Cricket [3]. The use of received radio signal strength for
positioning was proposed in [4]. Other techniques based on the
received signal strength include SpotON [5] and Nibble [6].
Time-of-flight radio signal propagation techniques were also
used in systems based on ultra-wide band radio [25], [15].
Researchers also proposed positioning algorithms for wire-
less ad hoc networks. In [26], Doherty, Pister and El Ghaoui
present a scheme in which the position of each node is
computed in a centralized manner. In [27], Bulusu, Heidemann
and Estrin propose a positioning system based on a set of
landmark base stations with known positions. In [28], ˇCapkun,
Hamdi and Hubaux present a GPS-free positioning system in
which the nodes compute their positions by a collaborative
action. In [29], Niculescu and Nath present a distributed ad hoc
positioning system that provides approximate positions for all
nodes in a network where only a limited fraction of nodes have
self-positioning capabilities. In [30], the same authors present
a positioning system based on the angle of arrival. In [31],
Savvides, Han and Srivastava propose a dynamic fine-grained
localization scheme for sensor networks in which groups of
nodes collaborate to resolve their positions. In [32], Moore et
al. describe a distributed, linear-time algorithm for localizing
sensor network nodes in the presence of range measurement
noise. The authors introduce the probabilistic notion of robust
quadrilaterals as a way to avoid flip ambiguities that otherwise
corrupt localization computations. In [33], Eren et al. provide a
theoretical foundation for the problem of network localization.
They apply graph rigidity theory to test the conditions for
unique localizability and to construct uniquely localizable
networks, and they study the computational complexity of
network localization.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have analyzed positioning and distance es-
timation techniques in adversarial settings. We have shown that
most proposed positioning techniques are vulnerable to posi-
tion spoofing attacks from external attackers and compromised
nodes. We have further shown that positioning and distance es-
timation techniques based on radio signal propagation exhibit
the best properties for position verification. We have proposed
a novel mechanism for position verification, called Verifiable
Multilateration (VM). Verifiable Multilateration enables secure
computation and verification of node positions in the presence
of attackers. We have further proposed SPINE, a system for
secure positioning in a network of sensors, based on Verifiable
Multilateration. We have shown that this system resists against
distance modification attacks from a large number of attacker
nodes.
Our future work includes a detailed analysis and possible
implementation of distance bounding and position verification
techniques. Furthermore, we intend to investigate the applica-
bility of our basic distance verification scheme to a number of
existing positioning algorithms.
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